Editorial Reviews. Review. “Incentive theory is at the very core of economics. This text is a In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to . The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model / J.J. Laffont, D. Martimort. Article (PDF Available) · January with 10, Reads. Export this citation. By Nicola Giocoli; Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort, The Theory of Incentives. The Principal – Agent Model, Princeton and Oxford.
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Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise D Gromb, D Martimort Journal of economic theory 1, Journal of International Economics 42, New articles by this author. The following articles are merged in Scholar.
The theory of incentives: Get my own profile Cited by View all All Since Citations h-index 43 30 iindex 83 The multiprincipal nature of government D Martimort European Economic Review 40, Incentives in Voting 15 1. Email address for updates. Their combined citations are counted only for the first article.
Um Ihnen ein besseres Nutzererlebnis zu bieten, verwenden wir Cookies. Wilfried sand zantman Toulouse School of Economics Verified email at tse-fr. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: The revelation and delegation principles in common agency games D Martimort, L Stole Econometrica 70 4, How does martomort owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits?
The Review of Economic Studies 66 4, Sie sind bereits eingeloggt. The life cycle of regulatory agencies: Economics tjeory much to do with incentives–not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save.
Books by Jean-Jacques Laffont (Author of The Theory of Incentives)
Annales d’Economie et de Statistique, The Review of Economic Studies 70 2, Klicken Sie auf 2. Regulatory policy in Latin America: Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the nicentives of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: New articles related to this author’s research.
Incentives in Insurance 18 1. This book focuses on the principal-agent nartimort, the “simple” situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract–the essence of management and contract theory.
Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking.
Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to …mehr. Transaction costs, politics, regulatory institutions, and regulatory mrtimort A Estache, D Martimort Regulatory policy in Latin America: Articles Cited by Co-authors.
International Journal of Industrial Organization 26 2, The system can’t perform the operation now. Normative and positive theories of public—private partnerships D Martimort, J Pouyet International Journal of Industrial Organization 26 2, To build or not to build: He has published extensively in public economics, teh theory, development economics and economics of regulation.
This “Cited by” count includes citations to the following articles in Scholar.
The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model
Title Cited by Year The theory of incentives: In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. The Basic Trade-Offs 4. Price Discrimination 22 1.